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Abstract 
 
On 12 August 2008, on behalf of the Council Presidency of the European Union (EU), 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy negotiated the Protocole d’Accord underpinning the 
establishment of the Geneva International Discussions (GID). The GID constitutes an 
international mediation format, co-chaired by the EU, the United Nations (UN) and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The GID has often been 
criticized for lacking tangible outcomes. Besides, very little is known about the 
contribution of the EU as a mediating actor, especially with regard to effectiveness. To 
address this research gap, this paper explores the EU mediation efforts in the GID. First, 
it evaluates EU mediator effectiveness through the analytical framework developed 
by Julian Bergmann and Arne Niemann. Second, it studies the conditions for EU 
mediator effectiveness. The analytical framework of Bergmann and Niemann 
proposes four key variables: (i) mediator leverage, (ii) mediation strategy, (iii) 
coherence, and (iv) conflict context. To this, the paper adds (v) mediator co-
ordination since the institutional set-up of the GID includes two other co-chairs (i.e. co-
mediation). The study finds that EU mediator effectiveness varies from medium to low, 
depending on the type of conflict issues (major/minor) addressed at the negotiation 
table. Although the GID did not succeed in reaching agreements on major conflict 
issues, such as the creation of International Security Arrangements and an agreement 
on the return of Internally Displaced Persons, it paved the way to cooperation on minor 
conflict issues like cultural heritage, humanitarian problems and environmental threats. 
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Introduction1 
 
A project aimed at achieving peace and prosperity itself, the European Union (EU) has 
made mediation an essential element of its foreign policy to defend and endorse the 
values which enthused its own conception. Article 21 of the Treaty of the European 
Union (TEU) lists conflict prevention and the preservation of peace among the major 
objectives of the Union’s external action.2 This has formed a solid foundation for the 
development of the EU’s comprehensive crisis management with mediation being a 
key tool at the Union’s disposal when dealing with external conflicts and crises.3 The 
adoption of the “Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities” 
can be seen as the EU’s attempt at developing the institutional setup and instruments 
aimed at achieving the policy objectives mentioned in the treaties.4 However, in the 
context of international conflicts, even well-designed instruments cannot guarantee 
the effective realization of the predefined objectives.5 In this regard, the Geneva 
International Discussions represent an interesting case study as the factors constraining 
EU mediator effectiveness are manifold.   
The Protocole d’Accord 6  negotiated on 12 August 2008 between the Russian 
Federation and Georgia induced the establishment of the GID to monitor the 
implementation of the peace plan.7 Currently, the GID represents the sole negotiating 
platform, set in two parallel working groups that address the security and humanitarian 
consequences of the August War.8 Although the GID is marking its 12th anniversary, 
                                                 
1  This paper uses the terms ‘Abkhazia’ and ‘South Ossetia’ as a terminology used in the 
international literature. The term ‘breakaway regions’ will also be used to refer to these 
territories, and terms such as ‘de-facto authorities’ refer to the current leadership of the 
breakaway regions since the latter do not enjoy international recognition. Finally, the Law of 
Georgia on Occupied Territories (2008) labels ‘Abkhazia’ and ‘South Ossetia’ as ‘Occupied 
Territories’. 
2 European Union, “Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union of 13 December 2007, Official Journal of the European 
Union, C 326, 26 October 2012, art. 2.  
3 C. Gourlay, “The European Union as Peacemaker – Enhancing EU Mediation Capacity”, 
Brussels, European Policy Centre (EPC), 2013, p. 2.  
4 Council of the European Union, “Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue 
Capacities”, 15779/09, Brussels, 10 November 2009.  
5 K.E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2014, 
3rd edn., pp. 3-5. 
6 Protocole d’Accord is the original name of the ceasefire agreement negotiated between 
Russia and Georgia on 12 August 2008. The following expressions will also be used to refer to 
this agreement: Six Point Agreement,12 August ceasefire agreement.  
7 Government of Georgia, Six Point Peace Plan ‒ Communique of the President of France, Tbilisi, 
12 August 2008. 
8 T. Giuashvili & J. Devdariani, “Geneva International Discussions – Negotiating the Possible”, 
Security and Human Rights, vol. 27, nos. 3-4, 2016, p. 386. 
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both the process and its outcome remain largely understudied. As the EU Special 
Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia, Toivo Klaar, noted: 
“the Geneva format is a somewhat misunderstood framework. This is partly because it 
does not provide for great headlines and there are no major events coming out of it”.9 
Besides, very little is known about the contribution of the EU as a mediating actor, 
especially in terms of effectiveness. 
To address this research gap, this paper explores the EU’s mediation efforts in the GID 
by asking the following two research questions: (1) to what extent has the EU’s 
mediation in the Geneva International Discussion been effective?; and (2) what 
factors influence EU mediation effectiveness? The analysis proceeds in five sections: 
First, it looks into conceptualizations and explains the framework for analysis. Second, 
it explores the conflict context. Third, it assesses the EU mediator effectiveness in terms 
of conflict settlement. Fourth, the paper examines the conditions for EU mediator 
effectiveness, that is, which factors constrain or enable the EU’s engagement. Finally, 
the paper summarizes the findings and provides policy recommendations for 
enhancing the EU’s mediation capabilities in the GID.  
This study faces several limitations. It has primarily been limited by the lack of publicly 
available information due to the sensitivity of the issue. Although information was 
collected through interviews with different stakeholders engaged in the conflict, 
constraints have been encountered in conducting interviews with Russian, Abkhazian 
and South Ossetian participants. Therefore, further research allowing to include those 
participants’ perspectives would provide a more comprehensive picture regarding 
the mediation process. 
 
Framework of analysis  
 
The study applies the analytical framework developed by Julian Bergmann and Arne 
Niemann 10  in order to assess the EU mediator effectiveness and to analyze the 
conditions for it.11 However, it cannot test a causal relationship between EU mediator 
effectiveness and the conditions of effectiveness. The analysis is therefore exploratory 
and represents a plausibility probe of the analytical framework applied to the GID. 
                                                 
9 “Toivo Klaar on Geneva Talks, Engagement with Sokhumi, Tskhinvali”, civil.ge, 8 February 2018.  
10 J. Bergmann & A. Niemann, “Mediation International Conflicts: The European Union as an 
Effective Peacemaker?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 53, no. 5, 2015, pp. 960-964. 
11  See E. Panchulidze, Limits of the EU’s ‘Co-mediation’: The Unfolding of EU Mediation 
Effectiveness in the Geneva International Discussions, Master's thesis, Bruges, College of Europe, 
2019. 
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The paper conceptualizes the EU’s mediator effectiveness within a conflict settlement 
dimension ‒ an external conflict perspective.12 According to Bergmann and Niemann, 
this dimension “refers to an observable change in conﬂict behaviour on the sides of 
the disputants, which may be observable both during the process of mediation and 
as an outcome”.13 The analytical framework proposes six different levels which allow 
to observe variations in conflict dynamics. Table 1 presents the six levels of the conflict 
settlement scale that allow to assess the EU’s impact on the mediation outcome. 
Therefore, EU mediator effectiveness is assessed depending on the type of conflict 
issue solved through the mediation. For this purpose, the analytical framework 
distinguishes three different degrees of effectiveness: high, medium and low.14 A high 
degree of effectiveness is achieved if an agreement is reached which solves either all 
or several major issues of incompatibility between the conflicting parties. A medium 
degree of effectiveness describes an agreement which solves several major conflict 
issues and some issues which are of minor importance to the parties. Finally, if the 
mediation results in an agreement to hold further rounds of negotiations, but no 
agreement on the substance of the dispute is reached, the degree of effectiveness is 
assessed as low.  
Table 1: Conflict settlement scale: conceptualization of the EU’s effectiveness  
Level Observable change in 
conflict dynamics 
Description 
 
5 Full settlement Agreement that solves all issues of incompatibility 
between the conflicting parties. 
4 Settlement of major 
conflict issues 
Agreement that solves some issues of incompatibility 
that are of major importance to the parties. 
3 Settlement of minor 
conflict issues 
Agreement that solves some issues of incompatibility 
that are of minor importance to the parties. 
2 Process agreement Agreement to hold further rounds of negotiations, 
establishment of procedural aspects for talks or 
strategies for implementation of concessions (but no 
agreement on the substance of the dispute). 
1 Ceasefire Agreement that obliges parties to stop all military 
action against the respective enemy and to seek a 
peaceful solution to the conflict. 
0 No agreement Mediation does not lead to any agreement, neither 
on substance nor on procedures. 
Source: compiled by the author based on the analytical framework developed in Bergmann 
& Niemann, “Mediating International Conflicts”, op. cit., p. 961.  
                                                 
12 Bergmann & Niemann, “Mediating International Conflicts”, op. cit., p. 961. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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The analytical framework has not been previously applied to a case study where the 
EU plays a co-mediating role. Co-mediation refers to the process which involves 
multiple mediators, complementing each other in a way that can improve the quality 
of the mediation process and its outcome.15 Hence, this paper addresses an existing 
research gap by applying the analytical framework to the Geneva talks co-mediated 
by the EU, the UN and the OSCE. After empirically assessing the EU mediator 
effectiveness, the paper also explores which factors constrain or enable the EU’s 
engagement. The analytical framework proposes four key variables: (i) mediator 
leverage, (ii) mediation strategy, (iii) coherence, and (iv) conflict context. To this, the 
paper adds the variable of (v) mediator co-ordination since the institutional set-up of 
the GID includes two other co-mediators.  
 
Conflict context: Is there room for EU mediator effectiveness? 
 
According to Cornell, “the very nature of autonomous regions from the outset entails 
the existence of certain assets which are conducive to secessionism”.16 After the Red 
Army’s invasion of Georgia in 1921, Abkhazia enjoyed the status of a Soviet Socialist 
Republic, while South Ossetia was granted the status of an autonomous region (oblast) 
in 1922.17 Later, these special statuses of Abkhazia and South Ossetia enthused their 
strive for autonomy from Georgia and eventually their unilateral declarations of 
independence.  
The controversial status of the two territories, aggravated by the nationalistic 
mobilizations of the Zviad Gamsakhurdia government in 1992-1993, led to intra-state 
armed conflicts. 18  Military confrontations resulted in the internal displacement of 
around 250,000 persons.19 Although the question of territorial integrity has always been 
at the top of Georgia’s domestic agenda, the wave of Color Revolutions in Eastern 
Europe provided new impetus to the discussions regarding the restoration of Georgia’s 
territorial integrity. 20  After the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia’s newly elected 
                                                 
15  J. Rendon, “Interdisciplinary Co-Mediations: The Good, the Bad and the Imago”, 
mediate.com, July 2008. 
16 S.E. Cornell, Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus 
– Cases in Georgia, PhD thesis, Upsala, University of Upsala, 2002.  
17  H. Tagliavini, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, 
Report, vol. II, September 2009, pp. 67-70.  
18 Interview with conflict analyst, via telephone, 25 March 2019. 
19 B. Whitmore, “Abkhaz Flip-Flop On Georgian IDPs Reflects Leadership Split”, RFE/RL, 3 August 
2008.  
20 T. German, “Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Collision of Georgian and Russian Interests”, Paris, 
Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), 2006, p. 4.  
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President Mikheil Saakashvili declared the restoration of territorial integrity as one of 
the major priorities of his government, together with the country’s Euro-Atlantic 
integration. 21  Georgia’s strident strive towards the West contributed to Russia’s 
response to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which was 
also a response to the Western recognition of Kosovo against Russia’s will. 22  
Finally, the security threats related to a further expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) to Russia’s ‘Near Abroad’ fueled the controversy between Russia 
and Georgia.23 The acknowledgement of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations in the 
NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration of 3 April 2008 resulted in Russia’s “dramatic return 
to the world stage with the invasion of Georgia”.24 Following the August War, two new 
realities became clear: first, Russia is rather suspicious of NATO’s expansion in its ‘Near 
Abroad’; and second, genuine discussions regarding Georgia’s membership in Euro-
Atlantic organizations are off the table due the territorial disputes.  
 
Georgia’s attempt of internationalization of the conflict versus Russia’s quest for 
legitimization of the ‘new realities’ 
The Six Point Agreement of 12 August 2008, brokered by then French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy and signed between the Russian Federation and Georgia, ended the full-scale 
military conflict between the parties.25 However, following the war, Russia unilaterally 
recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on 26 August 2008. It 
also established diplomatic missions in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali and strengthened its 
relations with the breakaway regions by signing a friendship agreement on 17 
September 2008. According to Phillips, this agreement institutionalized cooperation in 
20 fields with the aim to unify the breakaway regions’ economic and political 
structures with those of Russia.26 Besides, Russia was using political and economic 
leverages for an international campaign aimed at ensuring the recognition of 
                                                 
21 Ibid.  
22 Interview with Amanda Paul, Foreign and security policy analyst, European Policy Centre 
(EPC), Brussels, 25 April 2019.  
23 “10 Years After War, Russia Warns Of 'Horrible' Conflict If Georgia Joins NATO”, RFE/RL, 7 
August 2018.  
24 E. Chausovsky, “Looking Back on the Russian-Georgian War, 10 Years Later”, Real Clear 
Defense, 8 August 2018.  
25 M. Emerson & G. Dura, “The August War and Beyond”, Brussels, Centre for European Policy 
Studies (CEPS), September 2008, pp. 1-3.  
26 D. Phillips, “Implementation of the Six-Point Agreement between Russia and Georgia”, New 
York, The National Committee on American Foreign Policy, August 2011, pp. 11-12.  
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Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.27 However, only a small group of 
countries (Vanuatu, Nauru, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Syria)28 has recognized the 
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.29  
Russia and Georgia’s controversial standpoints over the conflict were also reflected in 
their actions at the international scene. Soon after the War, Georgia broke diplomatic 
relations with Russia and embarked on a quest for to internationalization of the 
conflict.30 While Russia launched an international campaign for the legitimization of 
the ‘new realities’ (i.e. the existence of two new states, Abkhazia and South Ossetia) 
in the region. 31 
Established in October 2008, the GID is held in parallel Working Groups (WG). WG I 
deals with security and stability arrangements on the ground, discussing issues such as 
the creation of international security mechanisms and the statement on the non-use 
of force and the WG II addresses the humanitarian aspects of the conflict, including 
but not limited to the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), cultural heritage 
issues, education, environment challenges and freedom of movement.32 Although the 
GID was specifically tasked to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire 
agreement, Russia’s recognition of the breakaway regions’ independence and the 
deployment of the Russian military on the basis of bilateral agreements signed with de 
facto authorities, put the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement into 
question.33 From Russia’s perspective, the ‘new reality’ nulled the provisions of the 12 
August 2008 agreement, including Russia’s obligation to withdraw its forces. Soon after 
the GID’s first round and in response to Russia’s actions, on 23 October 2008, the 
Parliament of Georgia adopted a law labelling the territories of the Autonomous 
Republic of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region (the territories of former South Ossetian 
                                                 
27  “EU Lawmakers Urge Russia To Reverse Recognition of Abkhazia, South Ossetia 
Independence”, RFE/RL, 14 June 2018.  
28 Vanuatu and Nauru first recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia but 
then withdrew their recognition. 
29 In May 2019, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Syria has published a statement recognizing 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and decided to establish diplomatic relations with Georgia’s 
breakaway regions. For more information see: “Syria recognises independence of Georgia’s 
occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, Agenda.ge, 29 May 2018.  
30 “Georgia breaks ties with Russia”, BBC news, 29 August 2008.  
31 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, 
Georgia, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1839 (2008) (S/2009/69), New York, United 
Nations Security Council, 3 February 2009, p. 2. 
32 State Ministry for Reconciliation and Civil Equality of Georgia (SMR), Geneva International 
Discussions, Tbilisi, August 2008.  
33 Giuashvili & Devdariani, op. cit., p. 386.  
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Autonomous Region) as ‘Occupied Territories’. The law declared all legislative or 
administrative acts issued by their de facto authorities invalid.34 
 
The GID’s constructive ambiguity: Institutional deficit or deliberate mediation strategy?  
The GID includes three international organizations, namely the EU, the UN and the 
OSCE, as co-chairs of the mediation. The format brings together the representatives of 
Georgia, the Russian Federation, the United States and Georgia’s two breakaway 
regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Besides, the Chairman of the Government of the 
Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and the Head of the Provisional Administration of 
the former South Ossetian Autonomous District also participate in the Geneva talks. 
The mediation format avoids name cards and allows all participants to be represented 
in their individual, rather than in their official government capacity.35 Although the 
format endeavors to ensure a mediation process that is neutral towards the status of 
the breakaway regions, the latter challenged progress since the beginning of the GID, 
even on the practical aspects of the conflict management process.36 Furthermore, 
the agendas and interests of the GID participants are drastically different. Through the 
mediation, Georgia strives to advance its objective of de-occupation and the start of 
a reintegration process, while Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia seek recognition of 
the breakaway regions’ independence.37  
Furthermore, the perception of the GID participants’ roles challenges the mediation 
process. The Russian Federation tries to position itself as a facilitator of the conflict 
between Georgia and the breakaway regions, attempting to put itself at an equal 
footing with the mediation co-chairs.38 Georgia argues that the Geneva format has 
been established to mediate the August War modalities, which means that Russia is 
internationally recognized as a conflict party and that it can therefore not be a co-
mediator of the GID.39 Georgia’s conflicting past with the breakaway regions dating 
                                                 
34  Parliament of Georgia, “Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories”, Legislative Herald of 
Georgia, no. 431, LHG 28, 30 October 2008.   
35 Interview with the EU official, Brussels, 26 April 2019. 
36 Giuashvili & Devdariani, op. cit., pp. 384-388. 
37 Phillips, Implementation of the Six-point Agreement between Russia and Georgia, op. cit., p. 
11.  
38 Interview with the OSCE representative, via telephone, 30 April 2019. 
39 Interview with Member of the Parliament of Georgia, via email, 20 March 2019. 
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back to the 1990s have also contributed to the existing unease. 40  Therefore, 
perceptions regarding the GID are diverging at two levels:  
 Mediators’ level: The EU officially affirms that the GID is the primary format 
established under the Six Point Agreement to address the consequences of the 
Russo-Georgian August War. The OSCE and the UN consider the grievances, which 
already existed before the August War, to be also part of the GID discussions. This 
can be explained by the pre-August War engagement of these organizations in 
the breakaway regions, namely the OSCE in South Ossetia and the UN in 
Abkhazia.41  
 
 Participants’ level: Georgia considers the Russian Federation to be a conflict party, 
occupying part of Georgia’s internationally recognized territory and exercising 
effective control over them. However, Russian, Abkhazian and South Ossetian 
participants see the mediation format as a platform designed to address Georgia’s 
internal territorial disputes, where the August War is considered as only part of a 
broader conflict cycle.42 
Nevertheless, the lack of clarity over the above issues has become the major reason 
behind the continuous functioning of the mediation process. This resembles the 
negotiation technique of ‘constructive ambiguity’ which aims to avoid a deadlock in 
the mediation process and leave room for advancing the different interests of the 
negotiation parties.43 In fact, by redirecting the focus from status-related issues, which 
has major significance for the GID participants, mediators managed to foster 
cooperation on minor conflict issues which are discussed in the following sections.44   
 
In between the negotiation rounds: Gloomy story of the ‘creeping border’ 
Russia’s continuous ‘borderization’ further challenges the situation over the conflict. 
According to Kakachia et al., “[b]orderization specifically refers to the unilateral 
installation of border markers, fencing, and barbed wire along the Administrative 
Boundary Lines (ABLs) that separate Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region (‘South Ossetia’) 
                                                 
40 “Interview: Thomas de Waal on Georgia’s policy on Abkhazia”, Democracy & Freedom 
Watch, 30 April 2016.  
41 Interview with the EU official, Brussels, 16 April 2019.  
42 Giuashvili & Devdariani, op. cit., pp. 386-387.  
43 K. Elgindy, “When Ambiguity is Destructive”, Brookings, 22 January 2014. 
44 Interview with the OSCE representative, via telephone, 30 April 2019. 
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from the rest”.45 The research conducted by the Heritage Foundation in 2018 identified 
56 incidents of Russian borderization since 2011 in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which 
eventually divided families and local communities.46  
The Georgian side believes that the policy of borderization is part of Russia’s broader 
objective to incorporate Georgia’s occupied territories under its political, economic 
and military structures.47 In fact, Russia formalized its efforts by signing cooperation 
agreements with the breakaway regions. In November 2014, Russia and Abkhazia 
reached agreement on an ‘Alliance and Strategic Partnership’ to cooperate on 
priority areas such as foreign policy and defense, economic and trade relations, 
cultural and humanitarian relations. The agreement encompassed Abkhazia’s fully-
fledged participation in Russian-led regional integration initiatives.48 In addition, on 31 
March 2017, Russia signed an agreement with South Ossetia to formalize the merger 
of South Ossetia’s military units into the armed forces of the Russian Federation.49 This 
agreement is part of the treaty on ‘the alliance and integration’ signed between 
Vladimir Putin and South Ossetia’s de facto leader Leonid Tibilov in March 2015 for 
25 years.50 Soon after formalizing their relations with Russia, on 9 April 2017, the de 
facto authorities of South Ossetia held a ‘referendum’ on renaming the region ‘the 
Republic of South Ossetia – the State of Alania’.51 The rationale behind the name 
change is South Ossetia’s eventual desire to be integrated with Russia’s North Ossetia, 
one of the priorities of South Ossetia on its path to secession from Georgia.52  
The cooperation agreements bring new agenda items to the GID and further intensify 
tensions between the participants. The EU has been rather vocal regarding the actions 
of Russia that are detrimental to the peace process. In the press statement published 
after the fifth Association Council between the EU and Georgia, the EU expressed its 
concerns regarding the implementation of ‘treaties’ signed between the Russian 
                                                 
45 K. Kakachia et al., “Mitigating Russia’s Borderization of Georgia: A Strategy to Contain and 
Engage”, Tbilisi, Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP), 2017, pp. 5-6. 
46 L. Coffey, “NATO Membership for Georgia: In U.S. and European Interest”, Special Report, no. 
199, Washington, DC, The Heritage Foundation, 29 January 2018, pp. 9-11.  
47 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Official Website of the Ministry of Foreign affairs of 
Georgia; Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia regarding the 9th anniversary 
of the August 2008 War, Tbilisi, 7 August 2017.  
48 K. Longhurst et al., “What Next? Developments in the Post-Soviet Space”, The Polish Quarterly 
of International Affairs (PISM), vol. 23, no. 4, 2014, p. 56.   
49 “Moscow, Tskhinvali Ink Military Agreement”, civil.ge, 3 April 2017.  
50 “Moscow, Tskhinvali Sign Integration Treaty”, civil.ge, 18 March 2015. 
51  United Nations in Georgia, United Nations Regrets Tskhinvali Referendum, Tbilisi, United 
Nations in Georgia, 11 April 2017.  
52 Coffey, NATO Membership for Georgia, op. cit., pp. 11-12.  
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Federation and Abkhazia and South Ossetia53 as well as about intensifying military 
build-up and restrictions on the freedom of movement in violation of Georgia’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.54  
 
Mutually exclusive perceptions: The EU’s impossible mandate? 
The reason why international mediation does not work is not directly related to the EU, 
or how the EU is practicing mediation. It is related to the fact that different parties of 
the conflict view the solution of the conflict and the way to reach these solutions in a 
different way. 55  Georgia fears to face a fait accompli on its path to the 
internationalization of the conflict, the reconciliation process and the eventual 
restoration of its territorial integrity. Russia considers Georgia’s foreign policy 
preferences as threat to its security. Hence, Russia incentivizes Abkhazian and South 
Ossetian separatism in order to maintain conflicts in Georgia, prevent NATO’s 
expansion in its ‘Near Abroad’ and hinder Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration 
process.56  
Abkhazia strives for independence from Georgia. Thus, Abkhazians are worried 
about the substantial decline of the Abkhaz population and the neglect of the Abkhaz 
language, culture and traditions. Abkhazia tries to use different cultural fora, including 
exhibitions and contests to represent Abkhazian culture worldwide. Even though 
Abkhaz people are unenthusiastic about their increased dependence on the Russian 
Federation, the choice is still between the ‘bad and the worse’, Russia and Georgia 
respectively. On the contrary, South Ossetia strives for integration with Russia’s North 
Ossetia. The 9 April 2019 referendum on the change of South Ossetia’s name to Alania 
was a step in this direction. South Ossetia tries to deepen its relations with the Russian 
Federation and formalize its gradual inclusion into Russia’s political and military set-up. 
Finally, the mediation process is complicated by the lack of clarity on what should be 
discussed at the GID as well as the roles of participants. The EU’s mediation is 
challenged on many levels. Therefore, unless a creative solution is found, the options 
currently on the table do not look promising for EU mediator effectiveness. 
 
                                                 
53 Council of the European Union, Joint press statement following the 5th Association Council 
meeting between the EU and Georgia, Brussels, 5 March 2019. 
54 Ibid.   
55 Interview with Amanda Paul, Foreign and security policy analyst, European Policy Centre 
(EPC), Brussels, 25 April 2019. 
56 Interview with conflict analyst, via telephone, 25 March 2019. 
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Assessing EU mediator effectiveness: Conflict-settlement dimension  
 
To assess EU mediator effectiveness in terms of conflict settlement, it is important to 
explore what the questions are that the GID has been tasked to address. According 
to Mikhelidze, the aim of the Geneva process was rather ambitious: the forum aimed 
at achieving an all-inclusive agreement on stability and security in the region, conflict 
settlement and the return of IDPs based on international law.57 As Devdariani notes, 
the objectives of the mediation format are relatively unclear because mediation is 
originally linked to the implementation of the Six Point Agreement, particularly the issue 
of security and stability arrangements and the IDPs.58 However, the recognition of the 
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia changed the conflict context. 
Therefore, for some GID participants (Russia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia) nulled the 
provisions of the 12 August 2008 agreement, for the monitoring of which the GID had 
been established. The analysis of primary sources shows that the conflict issues remain 
the same since the establishment of the mediation format, some of which have major 
significance, while others are of minor importance for the participants. The creation of 
International Security Arrangements (ISA), the statement on the non-use of force (NUF) 
and the return of IDPs represent conflict issues of major significance, while cultural 
heritage, environment challenges, etc. could be characterized as issues having minor 
importance for the GID participants.   
 
International Security Arrangements and statement on the non-use of force  
The NUF statement and the ISA are major conflict issues addressed at the GID since its 
inception. Although various versions of NUF-ISA papers were drafted by the co-chairs, 
there was no consensus reached between the GID participants. At first, it was thought 
that the political commitment to the non-use of force would follow the creation of an 
international security arrangement. However, at a later stage, it became apparent 
that the discussion about the NUF has to be held before a security arrangement can 
be agreed upon. 
The analysis of the co-chairs’ press communiques shows that in 2017 the negotiations 
have been close to an agreement regarding the NUF statement. In particular, the 
                                                 
57 Mikhelidze, Nona, “The Geneva Talks over Georgia’s Territorial Conflicts: Achievements and 
Challenges”, Rome, The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), November 2010, pp. 2-3.  
58 Devdariani, J., “Contrasting the Mediation Perspectives of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue 
and the Geneva International Discussions”, Bern, Politorbis, no. 60, Federal Department of 
Foreign Affairs (FDFA), p. 58.  
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press communique of the 40th round conducted on 21 June 2017 states that “the 
participants extensively discussed ways to find an agreement on a non-use of force 
statement and agreed to continue to work on this matter before the next GID round 
with a view to achieving consensus”.59 The press communiques of the 41th and 42th 
rounds refer to the extensive consultations “on the content” of the NUF with a 
promising wording regarding its finalization.60 However, the statement of 28 March 
2018 in the next round regrets that participants were not able to achieve a consensus: 
“despite intensive engagement by all participants, it did not prove possible to finalize 
the draft joint statement on non-use of force”.61 
On 23 November 2010, Georgia’s former President Mikheil Saakashvili unilaterally 
pledged the NUF when addressing the European Parliament.62 The text of his address 
reads that “Georgia will never use force to restore its territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, that it will only resort to peaceful means in its quest for de-occupation 
and reunification”.63 After a change of power in Georgia, the Parliament of Georgia 
adopted the bipartisan resolution of 7 March 2013, which also confirmed the NUF 
pledge. 64  Georgia’s NUF promise has been followed by similar pledges by the 
breakaway regions, reiterating their commitment to the internationally recognized 
principle of the non-use of force in their relations with Georgia. 65 However, such a 
pledge from the side of the Russian Federation is still missing. Even though the first 
clause of the Six Point Agreement signed between Georgia and Russia clearly 
represents a NUF obligation for both parties, Russia considers the agreement 
outdated and to not sufficiently reflect the new realities in the region.66  
                                                 
59 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), The 40st round of the Geneva 
International Discussions, Press Communiqué of Co-Chairs of Geneva International Discussions, 
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60 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), The 42nd round of the Geneva 
International Discussion, Press Communiqué of the Co-Chairs of the Geneva International 
Discussions, Geneva, 13 December 2017. 
61 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), The 43rd round of the Geneva 
International Discussions, Press Communiqué of the Co-Chairs of the Geneva International 
Discussions, Geneva, 28 March 2018.   
62 European Parliament, Strasbourg plenary session 22-25 November 2010, Georgia's Saakashvili 
pledges peaceful solution to dispute with Russia, Strasbourg, 23 November 2010.   
63 “Saakashvili's Address to European Parliament”, civil.ge, 22 November 2010. 
64 “Parliament Adopts Bipartisan Resolution on Foreign Policy”, civil.ge, 7 March 2013.  
65  S. Kapanadze, “Opinion: Non-Use of Force in Geneva Talks - No Can Do”, civil.ge, 28 March 
2018.  
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The co-chairs attempted to break the gridlock by proposing a ‘status neutral’ 
statement, affirming that the “participants of the Geneva talks commit to the NUF”.67 
However, the Georgian side blatantly opposes this formulation which is again linked 
to the status of the breakaway regions which are represented in an individual 
capacity at the GID. As MP Kapanadze notes, any wording that “participants agree” 
upgrades the status of Abkhaz and South Ossetian participants and endangers the 
Georgian position that the Geneva talks are all about the Georgian-Russian 
conflict.68 Besides, Georgia’s acceptance of such a statement could have been 
interpreted as an acquiescence to the Russia-driven “new reality in the South 
Caucasus”.69 Within a twelve-year timeframe the mediation efforts failed in fostering 
agreement regarding the major conflict issues. The issues of the NUF and ISA have 
become so intertwined that because of divergences on the NUF, the International 
Security Arrangements also remain blocked. According to interviews with EU officials, 
the discussion over major conflict issues is highly politicized with no promising 
outcome, yet the co-chairs continue consultations in search of an original solution.70 
 
The issue of the return of IDPs  
Another pressing topic for the GID is the return of the IDPs. Participants have “sharply 
diverging views on ways and means” in terms of addressing this issue.71 Although 
Russian, Abkhazian and Ossetian participants have continuously performed walkouts 
from the room, preventing the discussion of the topic,72 interviews with EU officials 
confirm that representatives of the breakaway regions are also interested in discussing 
the issue.73 Their major dissatisfaction is related to the ‘Resolution on the Status of 
Internally Displaced Persons from Abkhazia, Georgia and the Tskhinvali Region/South 
Ossetia, Georgia’ which has since 2008 annually been adopted at the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) and is aimed at strengthening “IDPs’ fundamental rights especially 
in terms of the right to a voluntary, safe and dignified return to their homes”.74  
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72 Ibid. 
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The Abkhazian and Ossetian participants oppose the discussion on the return of IDPs 
because of this resolution. They argue that their absence from the UNGA make the 
Georgian position to be the only one represented on this issue.75 This resolution is a 
tangible example of Georgia’s efforts to internationalize the conflict. Although the 
participants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s de facto authorities are willing to 
engage in a discussion if the resolution would not be adopted at the UNGA, the 
Georgian side sees no guarantee that they would live up to their pledge.76 Besides, 
after the adoption of the resolution, there is a full year between the next UNGA during 
which the GID convenes four times. Therefore, the Georgian side suggested that in 
case of a genuine discussion and engagement on the issue, Georgia would not bring 
the resolution at the UNGA the year after.77 The issue is nevertheless highly politicized 
and Georgia sees the resolution as a means of leverage within the negotiation. 
However, the impact of this resolution is also limited and in the long term the 
unsustainable situation of IDPs is likely to result in a situation that favors Russia. 78 
 
Minor conflict issues: Promising path towards conflict transformation? 
Although the GID is the format which mediates the Russo-Georgian conflict, the 
framework also proves to be a useful forum for communication between the Georgian 
government and the Abkhazian and South Ossetian participants. Table 2 summarizes 
three examples of practical cooperation which appear to provide a promising path 
to move to a sustainable conflict transformation.  
 
Table 2: Examples of technical cooperation attained due to the GID 
Small achievements which would not have been possible without theGID 
 Archive/Cultural heritage: Tbilisi and Sokhumi experienced successful cooperation on 
exchanging archival materials.  
 Movement of people/Humanitarian issue: because of the ongoing borderization, access 
to the cemeteries has a pressing issue for the local communities living on different sides of 
the Administrative Boundary Lines. There are cases where South Ossetia allows Georgians 
to cross the Lines for the purpose of visiting the cemeteries of their ancestors during Easter.  
 Agricultural pest/Environmental issue: hazelnut cultivation is a major sector in Abkhazia. 
The plague of the brown marmorated stink bugs in the western part of Georgia also 
affected Abkhazia. The destruction of hazelnut plantations caused by the bugs was 
immense. Cooperation between Tbilisi and Sokhumi consistis of expert meetings, 
exchange of information and practical activities. 
Source: compiled by the author based on an interview with an EU official, Brussels, 16 April 2019. 
                                                 
75 Interview with the EU official, Brussels, 16 April 2019. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid.  
78 Interview with Amanda Paul, op. cit.  
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This section offered an analysis of EU mediator effectiveness within the conflict-
settlement dimension. The paper first discussed conflict issues having major and minor 
significance for the GID participants. Regarding the assessment, the EU’s performance 
varies from low to medium, depending on the type of conflict issue addressed at the 
negotiating table. Although mediation was not effective in attaining consensus on 
major conflict issues, particularly on the non-use of force statement, the establishment 
of International Security Arrangements and the return of IDPs (level 5 in terms of the 
conflict settlement scale), the mediation provided several examples of promising 
cooperation at a technical level, on issues of minor significance such as cultural 
heritage and environmental threats (level 3 in the conflict settlement scale). Finally, 
the GID could be labeled as a process agreement (level 2 in the conflict settlement 
scale) since all participants express a willingness to hold further rounds of negotiations, 
while no significant agreement is reached on the substance of the dispute.79  
 
Conditions for EU mediator effectiveness 
After assessing EU mediator effectiveness, it is important to analyze which factors are 
likely to influence EU mediation efforts. The analytical framework proposes four key 
variables: (i) mediator leverage, (ii) mediation strategy, (iii) coherence, (iv) conflict 
context, and (v) mediator co-ordination. Although these conditions are separately 
discussed in the paper, they are tightly interconnected.  
 
Mediator leverage: The EU’s ‘coercive leadership’?  
Mediator identity determines the power or leverage she/he has on the mediation,80 
while leverage is defined as the resources and instruments the EU can use towards the 
conflict parties to foster an agreement.81 The academic literature on international 
negotiation analysis also refers to the notion of ‘coercive leadership’ which, according 
to Underdal, can be defined as a ‘carrots-and-sticks’ approach to affect the 
incentives of others to accept one's own terms or at least make concessions.82 An 
analysis of the EU’s leverage in the case of the GID reveals that the EU has both 
coercive measures and positive incentives at its disposal. The EU and Georgia enjoy 
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deep economic and political cooperation in the framework of the Association 
agreement, a Deep and Comprehensive and Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and a visa-
free regime, but it is Georgia’s EU membership aspirations (which has 78% of public 
support) that represents the biggest leverage for the EU.83 Besides the fact that the EU 
is Georgia's largest trading partner, it also provides around 120 million EUR worth of 
technical and financial assistance every year to Georgia. 84  Obviously, the EU’s 
leverage towards Russia is relatively weak compared to the one it has over Georgia. 
However, the sanctions and the fact that the EU is an important energy consumer of 
Russian gas give the EU a certain political clout. 85 While the conflict parties stay firm 
on their positions regarding the August War and the status of the breakaway regions, 
the impact of the EU’s pressure is noticeable. The EU managed to contain further 
confrontation. The mediator identity allowed the EU to put political pressure on 
Georgia, so the latter commits to a peaceful conflict resolution policy despite 
multiple examples of Russia’s policy of borderization86, as well as to contain Russia 
from further military offense towards Georgia.  
 
Mediation strategy: Combination of manipulation and facilitation strategies 
According to Bergmann and Niemann, a particular strategy adopted by the mediator 
is likely to impact mediator effectiveness.87 Based on Touval and Zartman’s taxonomy 
of ideal types of mediator, their framework distinguishes three mediation strategies: 
facilitation, formulation and manipulation. “Facilitation is the least interventionist 
strategy.”88 By using this strategy, the mediator facilitates the communication and 
provides information to disputants without providing proposals for compromise.89 The 
formulation strategy is a proactive strategy for mediation “by which the mediator 
exerts more control on the mediation process and formally structures the negotiation 
process, formulates alternatives to resolve the conflict and makes substantial 
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suggestions for compromise”. 90  The third strategy is manipulation which ‒ like the 
formulation strategy ‒ provides proposals and suggestions for compromise; however, 
in this case the mediator also uses political and economic leverages to influence the 
mediation process and have an impact on its outcome.91 
The analysis of the EU’s practice within the GID shows that its mediation strategy is a 
combination of formulation and manipulation. The EU is a lead co-chair in the 
mediation process, and the EU facilitates the preparation process for each round. The 
GID meets four times a year. Before all mediation rounds, together with the other co-
chairs, the EU conducts preparatory trips to Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and 
finally Moscow.92 By doing so, the EU extensively works with the participants to prepare 
the ground for the discussions and develop the agenda. Upon the co-chairs’ 
suggestions in 2009, the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) has 
been established. IPRM is an important tool for communication on the ground and for 
preventing any escalation.93 Interviews with EU officials disclosed that the co-chairs 
played a key role in the initiation, the adoption and the implementation of this 
mechanism. The EU has also facilitated the drafting process for the NUF statement by 
offering suggestions and working individually with the conflict parties. 94  While the 
mediation strategy is mostly about formulation, the EU’s ‘mediator identity’, its power 
and its leverage on the participants could also be considered as manipulation. 
 
The EU’s enduring quest for coherence 
Coherence is a concept which is often used when studying the EU’s foreign policy. In 
the context of peace negotiations, coherence refers to the “substantive agreement 
between individual Member States’ policies towards a conflict and the mediation 
activities carried out by EU institutions such as the European Commission, the High 
Representative or EU Special Representatives for a particular conflict region”. 95 
Starting with the analysis of the divergences between the member states, the EU is 
divided into different blocs. A camp of Nordic and Eastern members is mainly 
supportive towards Georgia, but Germany and France favor a pragmatic approach 
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because of their strategic relations with Russia. 96  According to Popescu, “these 
divisions between the EU members are easily exploited by Moscow and are one of the 
reasons why the international community has found itself completely incapable to 
stem the rapidly expanding Russian military, political and economic presence in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia”.97 Obviously, the member states’ division constrains EU 
mediator effectiveness.   
Besides, there is an incoherence at the institutional level: the number of institutions 
working on the conflict, including but not limited to the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), the Commission, the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus 
and the Crisis in Georgia, the EU Delegation to Georgia and the European Union 
Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), challenges the coordination and decision-
making procedures. Coordination between different actors is not always smooth, 
which challenges both the development and implementation phases of the 
mediation strategy.98 In addition, the political oversight and influence of the member 
states is still immense. The EUSR office, which facilitates the preparation for the GID, 
receives the strategic guidance from the Political and Security Committee where the 
member states are the major actors. 99 Incoherence thus exists on two levels: on the 
one hand between the member states’ policies and interests and on the other hand 
between the institutions. Thus, incoherence is a constraining factor for EU mediator 
effectiveness.  
 
Conflict context: Are societies ready for peace? 
The conflict context is of crucial importance for the mediation process. In this regard 
‘internal cohesiveness’ plays a decisive role, where “cohesiveness has been 
operationalized either as the parties’ internal power structure or as the nature and 
number of their constituencies”.100 Besides, the notion of cohesiveness is also defined 
as what conflict scholars call the ‘spoiler problems’ ‒ “leaders and parties who believe 
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that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and 
interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it”.101 Looking into the 
conflict context one could argue that in the scenario of conflict resolution the party 
concerned with the weakening of its power and influence would be Russia. For Russia, 
the existence of conflicts in Georgia is the source for having a continuous influence 
over its ‘Near-Abroad’, since the existence of unresolved conflicts hinders Georgia’s 
Euro-Atlantic integration process.102  
In addition to the spoiler problems another aspect should be thoroughly analyzed. 
When discussing the outcomes of the GID, mediators often refer to the extremely low 
level of willingness for compromise among the participants. In this context, it is 
important to explore whether negotiators at the GID have any room for maneuver 
when addressing issues at an exceedingly politicized forum. As international 
negotiations’ scholars emphasize, perceptions at the domestic level uniformly matters 
in the process of reaching the agreement at international level.103 
According to Kakhishvili, the public in Georgia is well-aware of the conflict, and since 
the 1990s it remains high on the political agenda. 104  The public opinion polls 
conducted by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) demonstrate that the issue of 
territorial integrity always ranks within the top five nationwide problems since 2009.105 
The population has relatively clear demands on how the government should deal with 
the conflict resolution process. “Recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia is not an option for the Georgian population, the only solution refers to 
the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity which would reintegrate breakaway 
regions within Georgia.” 106  According to public opinion polls of the Caucasus 
Barometer 2019, 85% of the respondents will never accept Abkhazia as an 
independent country, while only 6% would accept this option under certain 
circumstances (Figure 1).107 The results are similar for the question on the acceptance 
of South Ossetia as an independent country, according to 86% of the respondents 
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they will never accept South Ossetia as an independent country and only 5% believes 
this should be acceptable under certain circumstances (Figure 2).108 
 
Source: Caucasus Barometer 2019 Georgia, the annual household survey about social 
economic issues and political attitudes.  
 
Source: Caucasus Barometer 2019 Georgia, the annual household survey about social 
economic issues and political attitudes.  
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In addition to this, Abkhazians and South Ossetians do not consider re-joining Georgia 
as a solution to the conflict. Therefore, their demand/mandate for the GID participants 
is quite clear and does not foresee anything but independence from Georgia. Besides, 
currently there is no platform generating new ideas for conflict resolution or its 
transformation. In Georgia, the political elite is stigmatized around diverging opinions: 
Mikheil Saakashvili’s United National Movement for the August War and the ruling 
Georgian Dream for its overly reserved steps towards Russia. This leads to political 
parties’ reluctance to initiate creative solutions for conflict resolution.  
This study found that the GID is a highly politicized forum. The perceptions of the 
conflict-affected societies regarding the controversial options for conflict resolution 
leave little room for maneuver to the co-chairs, which significantly limit their mediator 
effectiveness. Besides, there is a lack of creative thinking and political will among the 
participants for concessions. The Geneva talks have proven that the government level 
(Track I) does not produce tangible solutions for the conflict. Since the issue of the 
conflict is highly sensitive for societies and governments fear to be unpopular by 
initiating options for conflict resolution, this study suggests extensive engagement of 
middle-range leadership (Track II), religious dignitaries, academics, civil society, 
grassroots leadership, NGO representatives and community developers (Track III). 
Track II and Track III should open the platform for genuine discussions which will 
eventually contribute to the GID participants’ readiness to discuss solutions at Tack I. 
Public opinion polls suggest that around 67% of the respondents would accept 
Abkhazia to have a high degree of autonomy within Georgia and 55% as regards 
South Ossetia.109  
 
Mediator co-ordination: Neither conducive nor constraining factor? 
As the leading co-chair in the negotiations, the EU’s work in the GID is complemented 
by the UN and the OSCE. The Russian Federation’s presence in these organizations 
resulted in the withdrawal of the UN and the OSCE missions from Georgia. Russia’s 
demand for new mandates reflecting the ‘new realities’ of the August War has been 
contested by the Georgian government by arguing that such a mission would violate 
Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.110 The closure of the OSCE’s large-scale 
mission in the region in combination with the withdrawal of 130 UN monitors left the EU 
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as the sole international organization on the ground. The EU’s around 200 unarmed 
monitors have no access to the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.111 
Before the August War the EU’s engagement in the conflicts had been relatively 
limited, therefore the EU requested the two organization’s engagement which have 
been operating on the ground since 1990s.112 However, from today’s perspective, the 
EU’s engagement and presence in comparison with the other co-chairs have 
dramatically increased.113  
The formal coordination between the co-chairs includes joint pre-Geneva trips for 
meeting with the GID participants. Besides, there are two or three additional meetings 
per year to discuss and strategize what to do for the next rounds.114 Although the co-
chairs co-ordinate the actions, the interviewees note that the effectiveness of the 
coordination largely depends on the personalities representing the three 
organizations.115 There are also differences in terms of the institutional cultures of the 
three organizations, their mandates and membership. In the case of the EU, Georgia 
and Russia are not present, contrary to the OSCE and the UN. 116 There are some 
positive complementary activities such as info sessions where the co-chairs specializing 
on the topic of the discussion can provide insights to the participants. This has high 
significance for the upcoming round. Besides, the co-chairs equally divide the costs 
for each GID session.117 
Overall, the EU’s co-chairmanship of the Geneva talks with the UN and the OSCE has 
both constraining and conducive effects for EU mediator effectiveness. The trends of 
the informal division of labor and the organizations’ expertise in different fields 
complements the EU’s mediation practice. However, the membership of Georgia and 
Russia in the UN and the OSCE constrains these organizations’ possible influence on 
the mediation process.  
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Conclusion 
 
This paper studied EU mediator effectiveness in the Geneva International Discussions 
by looking into the conflict settlement dimension. Subsequently, the paper explored 
the conditions for EU mediation effectiveness by analyzing five variables: mediator 
leverage, mediation strategy, coherence, conflict context and – given the GID’s co-
chairs – mediator co-ordination.  
The EU’s performance varies from low to medium depending on the type of conflict 
issue. Although mediation was not effective in attaining consensus on major conflict 
issues, particularly on the non-use of force statement, the establishment of 
International Security Arrangements and the return of IDPs (level 4 in the conflict 
settlement scale), the mediation provided several examples of promising cooperation 
at a technical level, on issues of minor significance such as cultural heritage, 
humanitarian issues and environmental threats (level 3 in the conflict settlement scale). 
Finally, the GID could be labeled as process agreement (level 2 in the conflict 
settlement scale) since all participants express their willingness to hold further rounds 
of negotiations, however no significant agreement is reached on the substance of the 
dispute. 
This study concludes that the EU’s mediator leverage and mediation strategy were 
conducive factors for EU mediator effectiveness within the GID. However, the 
incoherence between member states and EU institutions has constrained EU mediator 
effectiveness. Nevertheless, the conflict context has been identified as the major 
constraining factor. The findings of this study suggest that the conflict affected the 
societies’ perceptions regarding the possible scenarios of the conflict resolution, but 
does not provide any room for maneuver to negotiators at the GID for discussions of 
creative solutions for the conflict. Diverging opinions together with the spoiler problems 
‒ reflected in Russia’s enduring quest for maintaining power and influence over its 
‘Near Abroad’ ‒ negatively affect the degree of EU mediator effectiveness.  
Besides, this study found that the issues at the GID are highly politicized, and it also 
demonstrated a lack of creative thinking and political will among participants. The 
Geneva talks have proven that the government level (Track I) does not produce 
tangible solutions for the conflict. Although the study recommends Track II and Track 
III engagement in the process, it has been limited in developing concrete guidelines 
in this regard. Further research will have to contribute to an in-depth analysis for the 
Track II and Track III engagement.  
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Finally, this paper for the first time applied the analytical framework developed by 
Julian Bergmann and Arne Niemann with an additional variable, mediation co-
ordination. The findings suggest that mediator co-ordination has been both a 
conducive and constraining factor for EU mediator effectiveness. Although the UN 
and the OSCE positively complement the EU’s actions through a division of labor and 
equal financial contributions, the differences of their organizational structures, 
membership and mandates can be perceived as a constraint.  
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